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Abstract 
This paper discusses the use of dynamic modelling in consumer credit risk assessment. It 
surveys the approaches and objectives of behavioural scoring, customer scoring and profit 
scoring. It then investigates how Markov chain stochastic processes can be used to model the 
dynamics of the delinquency status and behavioural scores of consumers. It discusses the use 
of segmentation, mover-stayer models and the use of second and third order models to 
improve the fit of such models. The alternative survival analysis proportional hazards 
approach to estimating when default occurs is considered. Comparisons are made between the 
ways credit risk is modelled in consumer lending and corporate lending. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Application scoring (see Hand, 2001, in this issue for a review) in consumer credit risk 
assessment consists of connecting two snapshots of the state of the consumer – the first of 
their characteristics on application and the second of their creditworthiness at some later date. 
Thus it is a static phenomenon. Behavioural scoring on the other hand is a way of updating the 
assessment of consumer credit risk in the light of the current and most recent performance of 
the consumer. Thus it replaces the first snapshot by a description of the dynamics of the 
consumer’s recent performance, but the second snapshot still remains.   
 
When one considers the profitability either of a customer on a specific product or of the total 
profitability of a customer to a lender, one needs to use the recent consumer behaviour to 
estimate subsequent performance over a future time interval, not just at some specific future 
time. Thus, to develop customer profit scores one needs to estimate the future dynamical 
behaviour of the consumer. One needs a forecast of the dynamic behaviour of the behaviour 
score itself or the delinquency status of the consumer.  The latter would be a way of 
estimating how much default there will be in each subsequent period for a given portfolio of 
consumer loans. Such calculations are needed to forecast how much the lender needs to put 
aside to cover these expected losses – the debt-provisioning problem.  We investigate how 
Markov type probability models could be used to obtain this estimate.  
 
One can use models based on survival analysis ideas to estimate when customers will default. 
Such models allow one to estimate the profitability of customers on a product, since they can 
deal not just with default risk but also other profit lessening events, like early repayment of a 
loan. These approaches connect the recent dynamical behaviour of a consumer with the 
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dynamical behaviour of the probability of default and other measures of consumer behaviour 
over the whole future.  Thus one has transformed both snapshots of application scoring into 
“movie clips” of the consumer’s behaviour.  
 
In section two we describe the difference between behavioural scoring and application scoring 
and review the types of decisions that the former is used to make. Behavioural scoring has 
been in operation since the late 1960s, when Fair Isaac Inc. introduced such a system for 
Montgomery Ward (Lewis, 1992).  A detailed account of how such systems are used in 
practice is given in Hopper and Lewis (1992) and in Chapter 7 of McNab and Wynn (2000). 
Most such behavioural scoring systems are statistically based, but there are a number of 
probability based behavioural scoring models that have been suggested, based on the original 
ideas of describing the consumer’s behaviour by a Markov chain (Cyert, Davidson and 
Thompson, 1962). These have been reviewed in Thomas (2000). 
 
Section three looks at how one can change the objective in behavioural scoring from 
estimating default risk to estimating either the profit on the product or the total customer 
profit.  This idea of combining risk and return was suggested by Hoadley and Oliver (1998) 
and the problems in scoring the whole customer are alluded to in the reviews by McNab and 
Wynn (2000) and Thomas (2000). 
 
The Markov chain approaches to modelling the dynamics of consumer behaviour may not 
have become the industry norm for behavioural scoring, but they have found favour in 
estimating the probability to default (PTD) needed for debt provisioning. Markov chain 
models have been used in a number of different contexts in the last two decades – including 
road maintenance (Golabi, Kalkarni and Way, 1982), bridge repair (Scherer and Glagola, 
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1994) and health care (Fuller and Scherer, 1999). As the work by Weiss, Cohen and Hershey 
(1982) on hospital patient flow suggests, the difficulty in using such models is segmenting the 
population and then choosing appropriate state classifications for the different segments, so 
that the resulting flow is Markov or almost Markov.  Section four looks at the Markov chain 
approach to behavioural scoring, while section five outlines how such models can describe the 
dynamics of consumer repayment behaviour.  Accurate models require great care in 
segmenting the population into subpopulations and defining the states for each segment so as 
to ensure Markovity. 
 
Section six provides a brief outline of the survival analysis approach to estimating not if but 
when consumers will default. This approach was first suggested by Narain (1992) and has 
been developed recently by Stepanova and Thomas (1999, 2001) and Hand and Kelley (2000). 
 
In the conclusion, common features of and differences between the models used in estimating 
the dynamics of credit risk in consumer lending and those used in estimating the dynamics of 
credit risk in corporate lending are identified. 
 
2. Behavioural Scoring 
  
Behavioural scoring uses characteristics of customers’ recent behaviour to predict whether or 
not they are likely to default.  The methodology is very similar to that of application scoring. 
A sample of customers is chosen so that the data on their transaction performance either side 
of an arbitrarily chosen observation point are available. The period before the observation 
time is called the performance or observation period and is usually 6 to 12 months. The 
characteristics that will be used in the behavioural scorecard describe the customers’ 
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performance during this time. Typical variables would be average, maximum and minimum 
levels of balance, credit turnover, and debit turnover. Other characteristics estimate the trend 
in payments or balances during the period either by taking weighted averages or taking ratios 
of performance in the latter part of the period compared with that in the earlier part. Some of 
the characteristics are indicators of delinquent behaviour – number of missed payments or 
times over overdraft or credit limit - while others reflect difficulty in money management such 
as the number of cash advances using a credit card.  A pure behavioural scoring system will 
only include variables dealing with the customers’ performance and the current values of 
variables from monthly credit bureau reports. Other behavioural systems include personal 
characteristics such as age, time with bank or residential status as well the pure behavioural 
characteristics.   
 
The period after the observation point is the outcome period, which is often taken as 12 
months, and the customer is classified as a good or a bad depending on their status at the end 
of this outcome period. A common definition is to classify a bad to be someone who is 90 
days overdue at this point. It is not the case that all other customers are classified as good. In 
order to separate the goods and the bads as much as possible, those with behaviour that is not 
yet bad but is tending that way are classified as indeterminate and left out of the sample. Thus 
those between 30 and 90 days overdue may be put in this category and the goods are then 
those who repayments are up to date or, at most, less than 30 days delinquent. 
 
The methodologies described in Hand (2001) are then used to build a scorecard that best 
classifies the goods and the bads. One important consideration is whether to segment the 
population and build different scorecards on each segment. There are three reasons for 
segmenting scorecards – strategic, operational and variable interactions.  Some banks may 
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decide to target certain groups of customers, depending for example on their age or their 
residential status. They prefer to have a separate scorecard for these groups because they may 
wish to treat them differently in the future, by taking a greater risk exposure with them and so 
having a lower cut-off score. New customers with little credit history must have a separate 
scorecard because the characteristics in the standard scorecard do not make sense 
operationally for them. Similarly, customers who have no borrowing facility cannot become 
delinquent if they subsequently borrow and so may need a separate scorecard that does not 
involve delinquency characteristics. Finally there may be strong interactions between 
important variables. If the interaction is only between one pair of variables it may be 
sufficient to include the combined variable in the scorecard. If, however, one characteristic 
interacts strongly with a number of others then it may be sensible to segment the population 
according to attributes under this characteristic.  
 
One of the disadvantages of behavioural scoring is that one typically needs two years history 
to build a scorecard and thus the population one then applies it to may be quite different from 
that it was built on. One way used to cut this down (as well as taking performance periods of 
only six months) is to take a shorter observation period  - say six months - and classify 
customers as bad if they exhibit characteristics at the end of this period that suggest they may 
subsequently go bad. These characteristics can be obtained by building a separate scorecard 
on a different sample to find which characteristics are indicative that the customer will go bad 
within a further six months.  
 
This lag, between the period of time when the transaction information that was used to build 
the scorecard was collected and the period of time when the scorecard is used, means that both 
the population characteristics and the economic environment may have changed. The latter 
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problem is heightened because behavioural scorecards tend to have no external economic 
characteristics in them. The unwritten assumption is that the relationship between the 
performance characteristics and the subsequent delinquency status of a customer will be the 
same now as it was two to three year ago when the information on which the scorecard was 
built was collected. This is assumed to be the case no matter what economic changes have 
occurred in that period. 
 
Hopper and Lewis (1992) and McNab and Wynn (2000) both give accounts of how 
behavioural scoring systems can be used in practice. As well as setting credit limits, 
authorizing accounts to go into excess and pre-authorization of direct mailing offers, 
behavioural scoring can be an input into deciding how to deal with those in arrears. They 
advocate experimentation using a champion/challenger approach. In this, one splits the 
customers randomly and applies different collection policies to each to find out which works 
best on which cohort of customers, grouped according to behavioural scores and other 
characteristics. One uses the existing the policy (champion) for the majority of the customers 
and tries the new policy (the challenger) on a much smaller subset until it is clear which is 
more successful. 
  
3. Profit and customer scoring 
 
Behavioural scorecards have typically been applied to the customers for one loan product 
using their behaviour on that product. This is an example of product default scoring. More 
recently it has been realised that customer performance on one product may give good 
indications of their likelihood to default on other products. In particular, if a bank has a 
customer’s main current account or cheque account, it is a very good indicator of the general 
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economic health of the customer. Changes in behaviour in that account may well presage 
delinquency in loan accounts. Thus scorecards have been developed using characteristics on 
all the customer’s products with the lender to try and estimate the chance of defaulting on all 
or some of the loans. This is referred to as customer scoring or, more properly, customer 
default scoring (see McNab and Wynn, 2000) and the methodology is that of standard 
behavioural scoring. 
 
The competition in the lending market has made lenders think about the profitability of a loan 
as well as its default risk. Ideally a bank would like to score the profitability of giving that 
customer that particular credit line – a product profit score. Even more useful would be to 
develop a scorecard that assesses the profitability of the customer to the lender over all 
products – a customer profit score.  Some progress has been made in this direction, but as 
Thomas (2000) points out, a real profit scoring system would need to develop new approaches 
to modelling consumers’ performance. This is because to measure the profitability of a 
customer one needs to record their behaviour over a suitable time interval – not just record 
their status at one time point - which is the nub of default scoring. Thus one needs to model 
the dynamics of the customer’s behaviour. Two such models – Markov chains and survival 
analysis - are outlined in this paper. 
 
The only approaches to profit scoring that have been implemented commercially to date are to 
band customers according to a risk measure and a return measure and apply different policies 
to each joint band. For example, some lenders set overdraft limits by constructing a matrix of 
bands of behavioural scores (risk) and of average balance or some more sophisticated measure 
of return, as in Table 1.  Judgement is used to set the overdraft limits for each cell of the table. 
 9 
Thus despite the sophisticated modelling of the default risk, there is no real modelling of total 
profit nor of the way the decisions made affect the profit.    
 
Table 1: Overdraft limit as a matrix of risk and return 
 
Overdraft Limit Balance< £500 £500 < Balance < 
£2500 
Balance > £2500 
Beh. Score > 500 £10,000 £12,500 £15,000 
300 < Beh. Score < 
500 
£2,000 £4,000 £10,000 
Beh. Score < 300 No overdraft £500 £1,000 
 
 
4. Markov chain based models 
 
Markov chain based models of consumer behaviour provide an alternative approach to 
behavioural scoring and have obvious extensions to profit scoring. These models were first 
suggested by Cyert, Davidson and Thompson (1962) and variants of the basic model were 
suggested by Bierman and Hausman (1970), Corcoran (1978) and van Kuelen, Spronk and 
Corcoran (1981). However, there have been very few commercial systems based on these 
ideas; yet by extending the ideas from Markov chain models to Markov decision process 
models (Thomas, 1994) one can build profit-scoring systems that give model-based decisions 
on overdraft limits rather than the subjective ones described above.  
 
An example of such a model is as follows. The state, u, of a customer’s account is given by a 
triple u = (b,n,i) where b is the balance outstanding on the account, n is the number of periods 
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since last payment, and i describes any other relevant information. The decision to make is 
“what is the credit limit, L, in each of these states?”. To do this one needs to estimate p L 
(u;u’),  the probability that the account goes from u to u’ under credit limit L. One also needs 
to calculate r L (u), the profit to the lender if the customer is in state u and credit limit L is 
applied.  
 
p L (u;u’) is obtained  by estimating:  
t L (u;a), the probability an account in state u with credit limit L repays a next period; 
q L (u;o), the probability an account in state u with credit limit L orders o next period; and 
w L (u;i’), the probability an account in state u with credit limit L changes its information to i’. 
 
These probabilities can be obtained empirically by estimating the transitions in the histories of 
a sample of customers. One can then define the transition probabilities from one state to 
another by summing terms corresponding to probabilities of outcomes where there is both 
payment and purchase, payment only, purchase only neither purchase nor payment and which 
give rise to the required changes in b,n and i. The probabilities in these four types of outcome 
are defined as follows, 
 
p L (b,n,i; b+o-a,0,i’) = t L (u;a) q L (u;o) w L (u;i’),   provided b+o-a ≤ L, and a >0;  (1) 
p L (b,n,i; b-a,0,i’) = t L (u;a) w L (u;i’) (q L (u;0) + ∑o> L-b+a   q L (u;o)),  where a >0; (2) 
p L (b,n,i; b+o,n+1,i’) = t L  (u;0) q L (u;o) w L (u;i’),   provided b+o ≤ L;   (3) 
p L (b,n,i; b, n+1,i’) = t L  (u;0) w L  (u;i’) (q L (u;0) +∑o> L-b+a   q L (u;o)).   (4) 
These expressions depend on independence between the purchase, repayment and status 
processes – an assumption implicit in the way the probabilities t, q and w were estimated. 
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Note that in (2) and (4) there may be no new order either because none was made or because 
the new order would take the customer over their credit limit.   
If one assumes that a fraction, f, of the purchase price is profit ( including any profit from 
interest on the repayments), and that the lender writes off the bad debt after N periods of non-
payment, the profit in any one period is then 
 
r L (b,n,i) = f (∑o q L (u,o) – b t L (u,0) δ (n-(N-1))      (5) 
 
The second term reflects the assumption that a customer is considered to be in default when 
no payment is made for N  periods. One can then apply the standard dynamic programming 
approach and show that Vn (u), the expected profit over n periods given account in state u, 
satisfies the optimality equation 
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Solving this would give the credit limit that maximises the profit over n periods.  
 
This uses an orthodox statistical approach in that the parameters of the transition matrix are 
estimated from past data on other customers. Bierman and Hausman (1970) suggested that 
these parameters could be estimated in a Bayesian way, with the belief about the parameters 
of each customer being updated in the light of their own payment performance. 
 
 
 12 
5. Modelling the dynamics of behavioural scoring and delinquency 
 
The Markov chain model of consumer behaviour depends on two crucial assumptions. First, 
that the state space of the model does describe all the different situations that the consumer 
can be in, and second, that the dynamics of their subsequent behaviour does follow  Markov 
behaviour.  It is this latter assumption, that there is a simple stochastic model of the dynamics, 
which allows one to calculate the expected future profitability of each customer. One could 
hope that the same type of probabilistic modelling of the dynamics would work on other 
aspects of consumer behaviour, including both their delinquency status and their behavioural 
score. 
 
Although Markov chain models are not widely used to build behavioural or profit scoring 
systems, they are used widely to describe the dynamics of the delinquency status of a 
population. This can be used to estimate the expected loss due to default in the portfolio in 
future time periods and hence is an aid to debt provisioning. Alternatively, the estimates of the 
numbers of delinquents and defaulters in different time periods can be used to plan the 
resources needed in the collections and recovery departments.  
 
The models in use at present are fairly straightforward. The states are the different 
delinquency states – say 0,1,2,3,4+ months past due. The transition probabilities or the roll 
rates are obtained from past data. Take a sample of customers and assume their dynamical 
performance is stationary. Let n(i) be the total number of months customers are in state i 
(i=0,1,2,3,4) and let n(i,j) be the number of times that customers move from state i to state j.  
Bartlett (1951) and Hoel (1954) have shown that the maximum likelihood estimate of the 
transition probability p(i,j) is n(i,j)/n(i). Thus in table 2, if the upper number gives the number 
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of such transitions in the sample, the lower number gives the maximum likelihood estimate of 
the transition probabilities. 
 
 
             Next 
Current 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 
19700 
0.985 
300 
0.015 
   
1 
100 
0.25 
160 
0.4 
140 
0.35 
  
2 
7 
0.047 
8 
0.053 
45 
0.3 
90 
0.6 
 
3 
5 
0.05 
1 
0.01 
4 
0.04 
15 
0.15 
75 
0.75 
Table 2: calculation of transition probabilities 
 
 
This approach allows the data to define the transition matrices, but it may be sensible to put 
some restrictions on this. Thus certain transitions may be deemed impossible. This would 
introduce structural zeros into the matrix and has the advantage of limiting the number of 
parameters that have to be estimated. In Table 2, one might say that the transitions 0→2, 
0→3, 0→4, 1→3, 1→4, and 2→4 are not possible and that one may assume 3→1 is so 
unlikely as to be ignored. 
 
Having calculated the transition probability matrix P and given pi(0) the current distribution of 
the population between the states, then the expected distribution in m periods time will be 
pi(m)= pi(0)Pm . One has to modify this calculation to allow for attrition - customers who finish 
their association with the lender - and for new customers arriving.  Thus one has to be careful 
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to make sure whether one is calculating the delinquency status of the cohort who were 
customers as of time 0 or the delinquency status of the current population. The latter is 
constructed by adding together cohorts each consisting of customers who joined the lender in 
the same time period.  
 
whole
population
Segment 1
Segment r
Segment m
States
S1
States
Sr
States
Sm
 
  Figure 1:  Segmentation of population 
 
One needs to be confident that the dynamics of the model reflects the reality of the dynamics 
of the population. It is almost never the case that all customers will follow the same stationary 
Markov process. So the problem is to define a set of subpopulations r ∈ R and sets of states, 
Sr , for each such subpopulation, r, so that the process for each subpopulation is Markov, see 
Figure 1. In the delinquency models, the initial choice of states will involve conditions on the 
numbers of days past due together with conditions on the amount of the excess, to avoid 
insignificant debts being considered. In a behavioural scoring model, the states will be bands 
of the behavioural score.  
 
As in behavioural scoring one cannot easily separate the segmentation process from the choice 
of states in each segment, (though here one is segmenting to improve the dynamics of the 
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model rather than its classification accuracy).  Since one is seeking processes that are as 
nearly Markov as possible, one of the most useful tools is the χ 2 tests for Markovity, first 
suggested by Anderson and Goodman (1957). The idea is to compare the frequency with 
which the sequence of state transitions a→j→k occurred compared with b→j→k  for all k. If 
the process were truly Markov then these distributions should be the same for all choices of a 
and b.  
 
Segmentation into subpopulations is done for three reasons. One may use intuition and 
segment by the mix of financial products being held by the consumer. If the lender holds the 
consumer’s main current account there is much more information available to model the 
consumer’s situation than if that account is not available.  Mortgage accounts perform 
differently from personal loans. A second type of segmentation is by the age of the account. 
Consumers who have an established history with a lender are generally more stable than those 
who have only recently opened borrowing facilities, simply because the more volatile of their 
vintage have defaulted or moved to other lenders.  The third reason to segment is because of 
the behaviour of the account itself. One wants segments each of which is homogeneous in 
terms of its behaviour. One split that appears to do this quite well is the mover-stayer model. 
The idea of mover-stayer appeared first in labour mobility studies and subsequently was used 
in consumer purchasing behaviour. Frydman, Kallberg and Kao (1985) were the first to 
suggest its use in the consumer credit context and developed estimators for the parameters 
required (Frydman, 1984). Related estimates were developed by Weiss, Cohen and Hershey 
(1982).  In the context of consumer credit, stayers are those who pay off their debt fully each 
month and so always remain in the highest good state. Movers are customers whose payment 
history is more varied, including partial and missed payments. Some detailed analysis of these 
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concepts in the case of a large bank’s customer base (Ho, 2001) suggested the split between 
the two groups is about 50:50. 
 
Even with segmentation it is likely that models built on the initial choice of states are far from 
Markov. The χ 2 values in the Anderson-Goodman Markovity test will be way above the range 
for accepting the null hypothesis. In such cases, it is necessary to see whether more complex 
state definitions will preserve Markovity.  In particular if one defines a second order Markov 
chain, so that the “state” at any time is the current basic state and the basic state at the 
previous period. This increases the number of states considerably but many of the transitions 
are now not possible. However, it is surprising how often this second order state system is 
almost Markov. This is what Golabi, Kalkarnia and Kao (1985) found in their road 
maintenance models (though looking at the model after ten years of operation, Wang, 
Zaniewski and Way (1994) believed a first order chain would be sufficient).  Fuller and 
Scherer (1999) found a second order chain modelled the situation well in their work on 
healthcare expenses. If even this is not satisfactory, it may be necessary for some segments of 
the population to go to a third order Markov chain, where the “state” is the current and the 
previous two basic states the customer has been in. This is very likely to satisfy the Markov 
requirement, but the matrix itself is extremely sparse. If there were N original basic states then 
only 1/N2 of the transition matrix entries will be non-zero. However for some very volatile 
segments it has been necessary to model at this level of complexity. 
 
Even when Markovity has been achieved by segmentation and careful state definition, the 
resultant processes may well be non-stationary, as the transition probabilities are likely to 
depend on 
- the age of the accounts, s, 
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- the time period, t and 
- external economic effects, like the interest base rate, e. 
So one tries to estimate transition probabilities pr jk (s,t,e), which is the probability of a 
customer in subpopulation r moving from state j to state k, in period t, when their account is 
aged s, and the current base rate is i.  One model that has been implemented (by Ho, 2001) 
was to segment by age of account and for each segment define the transition probabilities  
p jk (t,e)  for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ e ≤ E by 
p jk (t,e)  = p0 jk  + ajk t + bjk e     (7) 
with  ∑k p0 jk = 1;  ∑k a jk = 0; ∑k b jk = 0; p0 jk  ≥0 ; p0 jk  + ajk T + bjk E ≥0 
 
This gave a good fit with reality and the signs of the a’s and b’s made sense in terms of the  
factors affecting delinquency. 
 
 
6. Survival analysis approach to profit scoring 
 
The Markov chain models describe the dynamics of a consumer’s movement through a 
number of delinquency states or scoring bands. If one is only interested in when they reach 
the default state and not their intermediate behaviour then one can use survival analysis 
approaches to estimate when this will occur. So instead of just asking which consumers will 
default, as in behavioural scoring, one asks when will they default 
 
Using survival analysis to answer the “when” question has several advantages, namely: 
i. it deals easily with censored data, where customers cease to be borrowers (either by 
paying back the loan, death, changing lender) before they default; 
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ii. it avoids the instability caused by having to choose a fixed period to measure 
satisfactory performance, which is inherent in behavioural and application scoring; 
iii. estimating when default occurs is a major step towards calculating the profitability of 
an applicant; and 
iv. it makes it easier to incorporate estimates of changes in the economic climate into the 
‘scoring’ system. 
 
Narain (1992) was one of the first to suggest that survival analysis could be used in credit 
scoring.  Banasik, Crook and Thomas (1999) compared the survival analysis approach with 
logistic regression based scorecards and showed how competing risks can be used in the credit 
scoring context. Stepanova and Thomas (1999,2001) and Hand and Kelley (2000) developed 
the ideas further and introduced tools for building survival analysis scorecards, as well as 
introducing survival analysis ideas into behavioural scoring.  
 
If  T is the time until a loan defaults then there are three standard ways of describing the 
randomness of T in survival analysis: 
survival function S(t) = Prob{T≥t} where F(t) = 1-S(t) is the distribution function; 
density function f(t) where Prob{t≤T≤t+δt} = f(t)δt; and 
hazard function h(t) = f(t)/S(t) so h(t)δt = Prob{t≤T≤t+δt|T≥t}. 
 
In the survival analysis approach, we want models that allow the application and behavioural 
characteristics to affect the probability of when a customer defaults. Two models connect the 
explanatory variables to failure times in survival analysis – proportional hazard models and 
accelerated life models. If x = (x1,….xp) are the explanatory characteristics, then an 
accelerated life model assumes 
 19 
   
S(t) = S0( e w.x t)  or h(t) = ew.x  h0( ew.x t) (8) 
 
where h0 and S0 are baseline functions so the x can speed up or slow down the ‘ageing’ of the 
account. The proportional hazard models assume  
 
h(t) = e w.x h0 (t ) (9) 
 
so the characteristics x have a multiplier effect on the baseline hazard. One can use a 
parametric approach to both the proportional hazards and accelerated life models by assuming 
h0(.) belongs to a particular family of distributions.  It turns out that the negative exponential 
and the Weibull distributions are the only main distributions that are both accelerated life and 
proportional hazard models. The difference between the models is that in proportional hazards 
the applicants most at risk of defaulting at any one time remain the ones most at risk of 
defaulting at any other time. 
 
Cox (1972) pointed out that in proportional hazards one can estimate the weights w without 
knowing h0(t), using the ordering of the failure times and the censored times.  If ti , xi  are the 
failure (or censored) times and the application variables for each of the items under test, then 
the conditional probability that customer i defaults at time ti given R(i) are the customers still 
operating just before ti is given by: 
 
∑=∑
∈∈ R(i)R(i)
00 }.exp{ }.exp{(t)}h.exp{)(h }.exp{
kk
t kiki xwxwxwxw  (10) 
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which is independent of h0. This approach, which does not prejudge the form of the baseline 
hazard function, is the one that has been most closely explored in the credit context. 
 
One of the disadvantages of the proportional hazards assumption is that the relative ranking 
among the applicants of the risk (be it of default or early repayment) does not vary over time. 
This can be overcome by introducing time-dependent characteristics. So suppose x1=1 if the 
purpose of the loan is refinancing and 0 otherwise. One can introduce a second characteristic 
x2=x1t. In one model (Stepanova and Thomas, 1999) with just x1 involved, the corresponding 
weight was w1=0.157, so the hazard rate at time t for refinancing loans was 
e0.157h0(t)=1.17h0(t) and for other loans h0(t). When the analysis was done with both x1 and x2, 
the coefficients of the proportional hazard loans were w1=0.32, w2=-0.01. So for refinancing 
loans the hazard rate at time t was e0.32-0.01th0(t) compared with others h0(t). Thus in month 1, 
the hazard from having a refinancing loan was e0.31=1.36 times higher than for a non- 
refinancing loan, while after 36 months, the hazard rate for refinancing was e-0.04 = 0.96 of the 
hazard rate for not refinancing. Thus time-by-characteristic interactions in proportional hazard 
models allow the flexibility that the effect of a characteristic can increase or decrease with the 
age of the loan. 
 
Survival techniques can also be applied in the behavioural scoring context, though a little 
more care is needed. Suppose it is u periods since the start of the loan and b(u) are the 
behavioural characteristics in period u , then a proportional hazard model says the hazard rate 
for defaulting in another t periods time, i.e. t+u since the start of the loan, is         
ew(u).b(u)h0u(t).   At the next period u+1, the comparable hazard rate would be that for t-1 more 
periods to go, i.e. ew(u+1).b(u+1)h0u+1(t-1).  Thus the coefficients w(u) have to be estimated 
separately for each period u, using only the data in the data set that has survived up to period 
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u. As it stands these coefficients could change significantly from one period to the next. One 
way of smoothing out these changes would be to make the behavioural score at the last period 
one of the characteristics for the current period.  Another way is to fit a simple curve to 
explain the time variation in each coefficient bi (u); so in the linear case one seeks to fit  bi(u) 
by ai + biu. Details of such an analysis can be found in Stepanova and Thomas (Stepanova and 
Thomas 2001).  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has reviewed the way consumer risk assessment procedures incorporate the 
dynamical aspects of consumer behaviour. One can think of application scoring as a way of 
connecting two snapshots of the consumer together – the first of  “his characteristics on 
applying for a loan” and the second of “his delinquency and default status a year later”.  In 
behavioural scoring, the first of these snapshots is replaced by a film clip of the consumer’s 
behaviour over an observation period of six to twelve months but the second snapshot 
remains. In both application and behavioural scoring this second snapshot seeks to measure 
the default risk of the consumer twelve months or so after the observation point. Though this 
risk is time specific, there is a hidden assumption that the relative rankings of default risk hold 
for some time into the future. However there is no attempt made to measure the default risk of 
the consumer through the whole of an economic cycle. Given the duration of such cycles and 
the relative speed with which the characteristics of the borrowing population change, it would 
not seem possible to do so using the existing methodologies.  
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The current interest by lenders in developing profit scoring systems means one will need to 
connect the observation period film clip to an outcome period film clip, since one needs an 
outcome interval of time to over which to identify the profitability of the customer.  Markov 
chain models are one way of describing the dynamics of the consumer’s behaviour in this 
outcome time period, and are used particularly to estimate delinquency risks either for debt 
provisioning or for sizing the collections effort. The survival analysis approach on the other 
hand concentrates on the time dependency of the default risk alone, not on the delinquency 
states leading up to it. The same approach though can be used to estimate the time dependency 
of other profit related risks like early repayment or attrition.  
 
It is interesting to compare the similarities in the models used in assessing credit risk in 
consumer lending and in corporate lending. The credit scoring and behavioural scoring 
methodologies were used in the 1960s to estimate the likelihood of firms defaulting. Taffler 
(1982) and Altman (1968) with their ideas of z-scores developed scorecards with accounting 
ratios as characteristics to measure this risk. They found that they needed different scorecards 
for different industry sectors and different countries, which meant the population of similar 
firms was too small for the approach to have the success of credit scoring. Interestingly, the 
company rating agencies  have recently returned to these ideas ( Falkenstein et al 2000) to try 
and get a semi-automatic way of rating all the firms who may want to borrow from financial 
companies. They are adding subjective estimates of the strength of a firm’s management to 
the accounting ratio characteristics and are experimenting with neural networks and other 
non-linear classification procedures to try and improve the default risk estimates. 
 
The dynamic Markov chain models described in section five are related to some of the 
reduced form models introduced by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) for estimating bond prices. In 
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these models the credit risk that the firm will default on its obligations is modelled using a 
Markov chain approach based on the credit rating given to the bond by the rating agency. 
These bond price models also model the interest rate process and the interaction between it 
and the credit risk. This is in stark contrast to the behavioural and credit-scoring models, 
which do not even include the current interest rate as a characteristic in their model, let alone 
model its dynamics. However, as was mentioned, one can introduce the interest rate as a 
parameter of the transition matrices describing the dynamics of a consumers delinquency 
status or behavioural score. Again the survival analysis models outlined in the previous 
section has strong similarities with the proportional hazards approach to credit risk in bonds 
suggested by Lando (1994). In both cases, one could include the interest rate as one of the 
characteristics that affects the hazard rate of default. 
 
There are also some examples where the corporate credit risk models and the consumer credit 
models tackle the same problem but with very different approaches. In the case of mortgage 
backed securities one can use scoring and survival analysis to build models of the early 
repayment risk on individual mortgages. Yet these, with their emphasis on the characteristics 
of the mortgager and the type of property involved, are very different from the models used in 
corporate finance to price a mortgage backed security, which is nothing but a portfolio of such 
mortgages. The latter concentrates heavily on modelling the probabilistic nature of the interest 
rate process and  assumes this to be the main driver of early repayment. Similarly there is little 
intersection between the scoring models used to estimate the default risk in individual 
consumer loans and the models used to price the risk in portfolios of such loans constructed 
for securitization reasons. Clearly the “average” of the behavioural scores says something 
about the expected risk of default in the portfolio, but one needs to get some extra information 
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about the correlation between the risk of defaulting of the separate loans to be able to describe 
accurately the risk at the portfolio level. 
 
The recent consultative paper from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) 
emphasised the need for banks to have internal models for estimating default risk at the 
sovereign debt, corporate debt and retail debt levels, and that there be consistency across these 
internal models. This will undoubtedly lead to a closer connection between the modelling of 
credit risk at the corporate level and the consumer level in the future, which will be of 
advantage to both areas. 
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